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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of. Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
MAX FLOYD STOCKTON, 
Defendant and Appellant 
PRELIMINARY STATE.MENT 
Defendant appeals from the verdict of the jury 
finding defendant guilty of attempt to commit burglary 
in second degree. 
The record on appeal is in two volumes one of 
which consists of the pleadings, minute entries and 
similar papers. All references to this volume are des-
ignated by the letter "R". The other volume which is 
separately numbered is a transcript of the testimony 
and proceedings at the trial. References to this volume 
are designated by the letter "T". 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The charge against defendant Stockton is "attempt 
to commit burglary in the second degree" in that on 
the 5th day of February, 1956, he then and there wil-
fully, unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously in the 
night time of said day forcibly attempt'ed to break and 
enter a certain building located in Huntsville, Weber 
County, Utah, occupied by Jesperson's Mercantile with 
the intent to commit larceny therein. (R. 1). 
The State's evidence showed that an unidentified 
person or persons atte1npted to gain illegal entry to 
Jesperson's Mercantile on the day in question. (T. 43, 
45). That a car bearing a license number BY 782 was 
seen in the vicinity of the Jesperson's 1\Ierca:ntile at the 
time in question (T. 27) and that defendant Max 
Stockton was apprehended in the company with Robert 
D·ean Carter and Lee Goddard in a car driven by Lee 
Goddard and bearing license number BY 782. (T. 35). 
That when the car was searched a padlock was found 
which was identified by State's witnesses as having been 
used in locking J·esperson's . Mercantile. (T. 36, 43). 
That Deputy Sheriff A. R. Covieo claimed to have had 
a conversation with Lee Goddard out off the presence 
of defendant Stockton at the sheriff's office after the 
arrest of the three defendants in which conversation 
and at which tin1e Goddard purportedly repeated the 
conversation to Covieo wherein Stockton, Carter and 
Goddard agreed that Carter and Goddard would take 
the blame for what had happened in Huntsville that 
night. (T. 84). In the late afternoon of February 4, 
1956, Stockton, Carter and Goddard 'vere seen in Hunts~ 
ville, Utah. (T. 29. 30). 
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The evidence of defense was that Max Stockton 
on th'e night of February 4th, 1956, while walking across 
the street at Washington Boulevard and 25th Street 
in Ogden, Utah, was hailed by two acquaintances, Robert 
Dean Carter and Lee Goddard and was asked by God-
dard if Stockton wanted to go for a ride with Carter 
and Goddard (T. 53). Stockton got in the car with 
Carter and Goddard, and Goddard drove the car up 
Ogden Canyon to Huntsville, Utah where Goddard 
stopped the car a half block from Jesperson's Mercan-
tile. (T. 53, 74). Carter and Goddard got out of the 
car, Goddard took a suit case out of the car and 
Carter and Goddard walked out of the sight of Stockton. 
Defendant Stockton remained in the car. (T. 54). De-
fendant Stockton testified that he did not know where 
Carter and Goddard had gone nor what they had been 
doing while away from the car, (T. 75), but that upon 
leaving the car and Stockton, Goddard and Carter had 
mentioned going to see a girl, (T. 74, 75) and that they 
would be back in a little while. (T. 54). 
After being away from Defendant Stockton for ap-
proximately fifteen minutes (T. 54) Carter and Goddard 
returned to the car and after driving around Huntsville 
for a short time during which an observer noted the 
license number on the car driven by Goddard the three 
defendants drove down Ogden Canyon and were appre-
hended in the canyon some miles away from the scene 
of the crime by A. R. Covieo, Chief Deputy of the Weber 
County Sheriff's office. In th'e car with the defendants 
was a suit case containing various tools ( T. 37) and 
parts of a padlock that was later identified by State's 
witnesses as having been cut off a hasp on Jesperson's 
Mercantile. 
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Not one of the State's witnesses saw defendant Max 
Stockton at the scene of the crime nor could they identify 
him as having had any part in attempting to gain entry 
to Jesperson's Mercantile. (T. 17, 24, 28, 29). Defendant 
Stockton and L·ee Goddard denied having the conver-
sation reported by Deputy Covieo wherein the three 
defendants agreed that Carter and Goddard were to 
take the blame for what had happened in Huntsville 
that night. (T. 66, 68, 75, 76). Lee Goddard denied 
making such a statement to Deputy Covieo. (T. 66). 
Defendant Stockton denied having any knowledge of 
any attempt to break into the Jesperson's Mercantile 
or with having had any part in the planning or com-
mission of the offense. (T. 74, 75, 76, 77). Goddard 
testified that the job was the result of the planning and 
effort of he and Carter, and that it was never discussed 
with Stockton and Stockton did not participate in any 
way in the commission of th'e crime. (T. 55, 56). 
Only defendant Stockton was charged and tried 
for this crime. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR A DI-
RECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFEND-
ANT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S 
CASE:. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR A DI-
RECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE· DEFEND-
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ANT AT THE CONCLUSION OF DEFENDANT'S 
CASE. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVI-
DENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF DEFEND-
ANT'S COUNSE:L A CONVERSATION BETWEEN 
DEPUTY A. R. COVElO AND ONE OF THE CO-
DEFENDANTS OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE 
DEFENDANT AND WHICH RELATED TO THE 
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. 
IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NUM-
BERED ONE TO SIX. 
v. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR A DIREC-
TED VERDICT IN FAVOR. OF THE DEFENDANT 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE. 
The elemental law in a criminal case is contained 
in section 77-31-4 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
"The defendant in a criminal action is pre-
sumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved 
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and in case of a reasonable doubt his guilt is 
satisfactory shown is entitled to an acquital." 
This basic rule has been reiterated in the case law 
of our State. In State vs. McCune, 51. Pac. 818, 16 
Utah 170, this Court has stated: 
"In order to convict, the prosecution 1nust 
prove its case and _~establish guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt". 
The defendant submits to this Court that at the 
conclusion of the state's case there 1vas no evidence 
that defendant Max Stockton had attempted to commit 
burglary. The evidence merely showed that ·some un-
identified person or persons had attempted to enter 
Jesperson's Mercantile at the time in question. That a 
car bearing license number BY 782 was seen in the 
vicinity and later stopped in Ogden Canyon and that 
the defendant was in that car in company with Dean 
Carter and L'ee Goddard. A padlock was found in 
the car that was claimed to have been cut off the door 
of Jesperson's Mercantile. 
There was nothing is the state's evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Stockton was 
guilty of the crime charged. No one saw hin1 at the 
scene of the crime. Although the state presented many 
witnesses, not a one clai1ned that he sa1v Max Stockton 
make any attempt to break and enter Jepperson's Mer-
cantile. He was not apprehended with any stolen lner-
chandise in his possession. No one claim=ed that the 
afore1nentioned padlock was in defendant's possession. 
The glaring defect in the State's case was that it had 
eo1npetely failed to prove all of the elements of the crime 
charged as required by the la,Y. 
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State vs. Prince, 65 Utah, 205, 284 Pac. 8, enumerates 
the elements of which an attempt consists. 
(a) The intent to commit crime. 
(b) The performance of some act towards the conl-
mission of the crime, and 
(c) The failure to consumn1ate its commission. 
If these are the elements that constitute an attempt 
to commit crime. It would follow that if any of these 
elements were missing the crime had not been committed. 
There is no evidence that defendant Stockton had 
the (a) intent to commit the crim·e or (b) performed 
some overt act towards the commission of the crime. 
Thus two of the three of the required elements of the 
crime charged are not proven by the State, and for this 
reason and for the reason that it was not proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime charged it was incumbent upon the Court to as-
sume the responsibility of taking the case from the jury 
and granting defendant's motion to dismiss. 
n. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
At the conclusion of defendant's case defendant re-
newed a motion to dismiss and the motion was denied. 
(T. 87, 88). 
The def·endant testified that he was invited to go 
for a ride with Dean Carter and Lee Goddard, and in 
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con1pany with these persons, with Lee Goddard driving, 
arrived in Huntsville, Utah, in the late hours of Febru-
ary 4th, 1956. 
Goddard stopped the car a half block from the 
Street intersection that the Jesperson's Mercantile was 
located on. 
Goddard and Carter got out of the car. Goddard 
took a small suit case from the car, and when defendant 
Stockton inquired as to where they were going, he was 
informed that they were going to see a girl. Defendant 
Stockton remained in the car alone for about thirty 
rninutes. Goddard and Carter returned and drove the 
car away. Stockton testified that he did not realize that 
an unlawful act had been committed until the trio were 
apprehended by the Deputy Sheriff. Defendant Stockton 
testified that he had no part in planning the commission, 
and was not informed that Goddard and Carter were 
going to attempt to commit burglary at this time and 
place. 
Lee Goddard as a witness for defendant Stockton 
readily admitted his own complicity in the crime, but 
denied that Stockton had any part whatsoever in its 
planning or commission, and further denied that Stock-
ton had 'ever been informed of the plan of Carter and 
Goddard. 
In the cornmission of all crimes under the laws of 
our State it is necessary that intent be shown to commit 
a crime. In State vs. Prince, Supra, it was stated that 
an intent to coinmit the act was the s~econd element of 
an attempt to conunit a crime. State vs. 111 cCune, Supra, 
holds: 
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"When the intent is the gist of the offense 
that intent should he sho,vn by such evidence as 
uncontradicted will authorize it to be presumed 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Defendant subn1its to this Court that in the first 
place the State has shown no evidence Stockton had the 
requisite intent to com1nit the crime, and in the second 
place the testimony of defendant Stockton and Lee 
Goddard absolutely negatives such an intent. U pan 
such evidence it cannot be said the intent to commit the 
crime was ~tncontradicted to a point that it could be pre-
sumed beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As pointed out in Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 
4th Edition on page 21. 
"All the circumstances as proved must be 
consistent with each other and they ought to be 
taken together as proved. Being consistent with 
each other and taken together they must point 
surely and unerringly in the direction of guilt." 
The explanation made by both defendant Stockton 
and Lee Goddard abnegates any clear and convincing 
presumption that Stockton could be guilty beyond rea-
sonable doubt. The ~evidence fails to point "surely and 
unerringly' in the direction of guilt. Stockton could 
have been and was along just for the ride. Who can 
say on the basis of the evidence that beyond reasonable 
doubt defendant Stockton was aware of the plans of 
Carter and Goddard, helped planned the burglary and 
aided in its co1nmission. The State was without evidence 
to show this to the extent required by law. The testi-
Inony of defendant Stockton and Lee Goddard point 
the way to defendant's innocence. 
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III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING-
IN~eo EVIDENCE OVER THE, OBJECTION OF DE-
FENDANT'S COUNSEL A CONVERSATION BE-
rPWEEN DEPUTY A. R. COVElO AND ONE OF THE 
CO-DEFENDANTS OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF 
DEFENDANT AND WHICH RELATED TO THE 
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 
The conversation objected to is found on page 83 
of the transcript commencing with line 19 and is as 
follows: 
Q. Do you have any recollection with regard-
did you have a conversation with Lee Goddard relative 
to his stating that they were willing to take the blame. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Will you tell us what that conversation was f 
A. I talked with Lee Goddard about this burglary 
1n Huntsville. 
Mr. Handy: Just a moment may I voir dire the wit-
ness your honor. 
The Court : Yes. 
Voir dire exan1ination by Mr. Handy: 
Q. Was this conversation, Officer Covieo m the 
presence of Mr. Stockton. 
A. No sir. 
Mr. Handy: I object to it your honor as being hear-
say. 
10 
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Argument 
rrhe Court: I'll overrule the objection as an excep-
tion to the rule. You may testify. 
(To witness) Now do you remember the last ques-
tion' 
A. Yes, I had a conversation with Lee Goddard 
pertajning to Max Stockton. Goddard told me just be-
fore-well just after I had stopped the car at the time 
he was getting out of the car he stated the conversation 
between Lee Goddard and Dean Carter and Max Stockton 
was, should Lee Goddard take the blame along with 
Dean Carter and leave Max Stockton out of it because 
of the ~eriousness of it and Max Stockton said yes, that 
he did want them to take the blame because of the ser-
iousness of the trouble he was already in. 
It must be noted here that tlre conversation ob-
jected to occured at a time when the defendant and 
Carter and Goddard had been arrested and were in the 
custody of the Sheriff in the County jaiil. Such a state-
ment would be hearsay and inadmissable in evidence 
against the defendant Stockton. 
In People vs. Roberts, (California,) 254 Pac. 2nd 
501, 504, the same issue was raised, the Court there held: 
"The evidence of Syas' (co-conspirator) con-
tradictory extra judicial statements was admis-
sable against him, both because it tended to prove 
that he had in fact associated with and worked 
for Roberts and because it tended to impeach 
Syas. Such evidence however, would be inad-
misable hearsay as to Roberts. (The defendant) 
(People vs. Gillaland, 1940) 39 Cal App'eal 2nd, 
250, 262, 103 Pac. 2nd, 179 : 
11 
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(Fiswick vs. United States (1946) 329 lT. S. 
211, 217, 67 S. Ct. 224, 91 L. Ed. 196. ("Confes-
sion or admission by one co-conspirator ajte1: he 
has been apprehended is not in any sense a frwr-
therence of a criminal enterprise. It is rather 
a frustration of it) * * * * (A conspirators) ad-
missions were therefore not admissable against 
his erstwhile fellow conspirators.)" 
The holding of the Oklahoma Courts is as follows: 
Parnell vs. State, Oklahoma 250 Puc. 2nd, 474, 478, 
479. 
"We think it may be said as a general rule, 
the arrest of co-conspirators may be said to ef-
fectively preclude any further concerted actions 
and ordinarily puts an end to the conspiracy and 
accordingly any statement by a co-conspirator 
out of the presence of his other co-conspirators 
made qfter his arrest and confinenlent in jail 
would be hearsay and inadmissable." 
Leeth vs. State, Oklahoma 230 Pac. 2nd. 942, 951. 
" * * * * * statements made by a co-defendant 
after the termination of the conspiracy between 
the defendant and co-defendant, if any existed, 
are not admissable against defendant on trial, 
and where such statements are clearly prejudic-
ial their admission is reversable error." 
Ramsey vs. State 250 Pac. 936, Schuh cs. State, 
280 Pacific 869. [~nderhill on Cri1ninal Evidence 
3rd Edition, Section 719, page 936. 
Montana rule is the san1e and is found in State vs. 
Keller Montana 246 Pac. 2nd 81'7, 822. 
The Utah (~ase of State vs. !:3intpson 236 Pac. 2nd 
107'7, 1078, in regard to a conversation of a co-defendant 
out of the presl\nce of the defendant had this to say: 
12 
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'~There can be as there \vas here, a conspir-
acy between persons to engage jointly in othwr 
criminal offenses and if this fact is shown by 
independent evidence, the statements of any of 
the conspirators, made in furtherance of the 
com1non criminal purpose is unquestionably ad-
missable against all." 
According to the above Utah case there must be 
-independent evidence of other criminal offenses, and 
only if the state1nents were 1nade in furtherance of the 
co1n1non criminal purpose are the statements admissable. 
In the instant case any conspiracy was at an end 
inasmuch as all three defendants were arrested and 
incarcerated at the time the statements were alleged 
to have been made. 
In State vs. Simpson, supra, the California. case of 
People vs. Suitor 111 Pac. 2nd 23, 31, was quoted from 
in support of its holding and this statement is found 
in that case. 
"Of course it must reasonably appear that 
such acts were committed in furtheranee of the 
common design of the conspiracy." 
In the instant case it was denied by both defendants 
Stockton and his co-defendant Goddard that there was 
any common design to take the blam~e from Stockton and 
place it solely upon the shoulders of Carter and Goddard. 
The conversation in regard to this matter is even denied. 
In State vs. Erwin, Utah 120 Pacific 2nd, 285, it was 
held: 
"* * * * extra judicial declarations of each 
conspirator may be used against his co-conspir-
ator, but not to prove existence of the conspiracy. 
13 
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That fact must be proved by other evidence. and 
in a conspiracy case each accomplice is a co-con-
spirator with· all the others and thus the existence 
of the conspiracy may not be proved by the e:rtra 
judicial declarations of a co-conspirator. J>roof 
of the existence of the conspiracy is an essential 
element of the corpus delecti in the case and 
therefore may not be proved by the extra judicial 
declarations of an acomplice. See Wigmore on 
Evidence 2nd Edition 1048, 1078, 1079. Terry cs. 
United States 7 Fed. 2nd 28, State ~cs. Inlou· 
141 Pac. 530 (Utah), Looney vs. Bingham Dairy 
75 Utah 53, 282 Pac. 1030, 73 A. L. R. 427. 
Thus in the case at bar the existence of the con-
spiracy whether to burglarize the Huntsville Mercantile 
or to shift the blame for the offense is a matter that 
may not be proved by the extra judicial declarations 
of a co-conspirator and the conversation allegedly had 
between deputy Covieo and co-defendant Goddard after 
the apprehension and arrest of the three defendants 
and which was had out of the presence of the defendant 
Stockton, would be hearsay and inadmissable. 
IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE, JURY AS REQUESTED IN DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NUM-
BERED ONE TO SIX. 
Instruction No. 1 is as follo,Ys : 
"You are instructed that if you find fron1 the 
evidence that although defendant Max Floyd 
Stockton, drove to the scene of the crilne "~ith 
Lee Goddard and Dean Carter he did not directly 
14 
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connnit an act constituting a crin1e, nor did he 
aid or abet the commission of the crnne, you 
will find the defendant not guilty." 
lt was error to refuse this instruction for the reason 
that there was evidenc(_. that defendant Stockton did 
not directly commit an act constituting a crime and 
did nothjng to plan or aid in its commission or to put it 
in another way there is no evidence that defendant 
Stockton did any act that would constitute a crime nor 
is th•ere any evidence that he planned or aided in the 
commission of this crime. 
63. 
See 14 American Jurisprudence, Page 812, Section 
"A person is not liable for the acts of another 
merely because he is present when it is commit-
ted". 
Requested Instruction No. 2 is as follows : 
"You are instructed that an attempt to com-
mit a crime consists of three elements (a) the 
intent to commit the crime (b) the performance 
of same act towards the commission of the crime 
and (c) failure to consummate its commission, 
and if you find from the evidence that anyone or 
more of the above elem'ents is missing from the 
case under consideration you will find the de-
fendant not guilty." 
An attempt to commit a cri1ne consists of three 
elements which are enumerated in the above instruction. 
It is obvious that if any of the elernents is missing 
that the crime would not be complete. The instruction 
requested was a correct instruction and was in con-
formity with law and the facts of the case. See State 
vs. Prince 75 Utah, 205, 284 Pac. 108. 
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Requested Instruction No. 3 is as follows : 
"You are instructed that in order to consti-
tute an attemept to commit a crime it is essential 
that the defendant with the intent of committing 
the particular crim'e do some overt act adapted 
to, approximating, and which in the ordinary 
and likely course of things will result in the conl-
mission thereof. Therefore the act must reach 
far enough towards the accomplishment of the 
desired result to amount to the eommencen1ent of 
the consummation. The act must not be 1nerely 
preparatory. 
There was no evidence that defendant Stockton 
with an intent to commit the crime charged did an overt 
act towards its accomplishment. The instruction is a 
correct expression of the law to be applied to the facts 
in evidence. See 14 American Jurisprudence, Section 
68, Page 816. 
Requested Instruction No. 4 is as follows : 
You are instructed that if an attempt to conl-
mit a crime be voluntarily and freely abandoned 
before the act is put in process of final execution 
there being no outside cau~e pron1pting such 
abandonment then this is a defense and if you 
find from the evidence that the defendant vol-
untarily abandoned an attempt to burglariz;e 
Jesperson's Mercantile in Huntsville, Utah, on 
February 5, 1956, then you will find the defend-
ant not guilty. 
The evidence presents the question of whether or 
not the attempt to commit the crin1e was in fact aban-
doned voluntarily before the act was put in process of 
final execution. The evidence sho,vs clearly that 
if there was an abandonment it "·as voluntary. It is 
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obYious that any attempt to burglarize was abandoned 
because Carter and Goddard could not force an entry 
into the building. 
The requested instruction was in conformity with 
the facts and applicabl'e law. See fJ7 harton' s Criminal 
Law, Volume 1 Section 226, page 306. 
Requested Instruction No. 6 is as follows: 
You are instructed that in order for a person 
to be an accomplice he must in some manner 
knowingly and with criminal intent, aid, abet, 
assist or participate in the criminal act, and you 
are further instructed that the mere presence of 
the defendant at the scene of the crime combined 
with knowledge that crime is about to be com-
mitted or a mental approbation while the will 
contributes nothing to the doing of the act will 
not of its'elf constitute the defendant an ac-
complice. 
None of the States witness could identify defend-
ant Stockton as taking any part in the commission of 
the crime. The only evidence presented against de-
fendant Stockton is that Stockton was in the car with 
Carter and Goddard when the car was stopped in Ogden 
Canyon some miles from the scene of the crime. The 
instruction was a correct presentation of the law as 
found in State vs. Fertig, Utah, 233 P2, 347, 349 and 
the evidence was such as to warrant the giving of the 
instruction and it was error not to do so. 
v. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION. 
Point V should be considered in conjunction with 
Points I and II. 
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In the case at bar, the only evidence that connects 
the defendant Stockton with the commission of the 
crime charged is that he was in the company with Robert 
Dean Carter and Lee Goddard when their car was 
stopped in Ogden Canyon, some miles from the scene of 
the alleged crim'e and the alleged, uncorroborated, hear-
say statements of an accomplice, that Stockton helped 
plan the crime. 
In State vs. Laub, 131 Pac. 2nd, 805 four defendant~ 
Cannon, Laub, Reber and Pectol were convicted of 
grand larceny in that they killed and stole a beef be-
longing to Charles Foster. 
The Facts showed that defendant Cannon was with 
the other defendants at the place near where the beef 
was slaughtered. That the other defendants \Vere ob-
served to have blood on their hands and clothing at or 
near the place. All of the defendants made false state-
ments about their actions and the type of meat in their 
poss'ession. 
The conviction of defendant Cannon was reversed 
on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to 
sustain the conviction, and in so doing the Court said: 
"While the State's evidence is circun1stantial 
such evidence may be just as conclusive or even 
more so than direct evidence, but the prosecution 
still has the burden of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant is guilty or stated 
another way the prosecution 1nust not only sho"T 
by a preponderance of evidence an offense \vas 
committed and that the alleged facts and cir-
cumstances are true, bnt they nl ust also be such 
facts and circun~stances as are incornpatible upon 
any reasonable hypothesis other than defendant's 
guilt. 
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People vs. Scott, 10 Utah 217, 37 Pac. 335, 
See also State vs. Burch, 100 Utah, 414, 115 Pac. 
2nd 911, State vs. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 
Pac. 2nd 1030. As pointed out in Underhills 
Criminal Evidence 4th edition, page 21, all the 
circumstances as proved must be consistent with 
• 
each other and they are to be taken together as 
proved. Being consistent with each other and 
taken together they must point surely and un-
erringly in the direction of guilt * * * * *" Hence 
if two reasonable hypothesis are pointed out by 
the evidence and one of them points to the de-
fendant's innocence it would then be difficult 
to see how any jury could be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. 
* * * * *He (Cannon) was not with th~e other 
three defendants when they came from the woods, 
he did not have any blood on him nor did he stay 
~th the other defendants so that the court or 
jury could infer that he help·ed bring the carcass 
to the truck. The uncontradicted evidence is 
that he went with the Trumans to help them load 
wood and did not rejoin the other defendants 
until they were ready to leave for home. The 
only evidence which points to his guilt is that he 
made false statements about trading pine nuts 
for the meat in Nevada and he took part of the 
meat. This is not sufficient to uphold his con-
viction. This is not a charge of conspiracy and 
there is no evidence that he in any way aided in 
or planned the commission of the crime. The 
conviction of Cannon is not sustained by the 
evidence and must be reversed." 
If the evidence in tlre above case was insufficient 
to sustain the conviction of defendant Cannon, who was 
seen with the other defendants at the scene of the 
crime, and who was found in possession of some of 
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the stolen meat, and who made false statements about 
possession of part of the stolen meat, how could it be 
said in the case before the court that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the conviction of defendant Stock-
ton when he was not seen at the scene of the crime, but 
was only found in the presence of the other two co-
defendants some miles from the scene of the crime. In 
addition to the above evidence against Stockton, it must 
be pointed out that the State attempted to prove de-
fendant Stockton's complicity in the crime by the alleged 
conversation with Goddard with Deputy Covieo, which 
has been dealt with above, and which cannot be said to 
add sufficient evidence toward the conviction. This 
also, is not a charge of conspiracy and there is no evi-
dence that he in any way aided in, or planned the com-
mission of the crime. The conviction should be reversed 
because it is not sustained by the evidence. 
In addition to the above argument, it should be 
pointed out that it could have been only on the basis 
of the alleged conversation between Goddard and Dep-
uty Covieo that the jury convicted defendant Stockton. 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 77-31-18 
A conviction shall not be had on the testin1ony 
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by 
other evidence, which ·in itself and ·zrithout the 
aid of the testimony of the acconzplice tends to 
connect the defendant with the connnission of the 
offense; and the corroboration shall not be suf-
ficient if it merely shows the co1n1nission of the 
' . 
offense or the eircun1stances thereof. 
If the co-defendant Goddard, did have the conver-
~ation with Deputy Covieo that the officer claiu1ed and 
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if such a conversation is admissable in evidence against 
the defendant, was there 'other evidence' corroborating 
this testimony which in itself and without the aid of, 
tends to connect the defendant Stockton with the com-
lnission of the offense t The only other evidence was 
the fact that Stockton was with the other defendants. 
State 'CS. Spencer, Utah, 49 P. 302 states that there 
n1ust be corroboration of such material facts as con-
stitute the necessary elements of the crime charged. 
Can it be said that the fact that Stockton was with 
Carter and Goddard was a material fact constituting a 
necessary element of the crime 1 Not according to State 
vs. Prince, supra. See also State vs. Collett, Utah, 58 
P. 684. 
State vs. Coroles Utah, 277 P. 203 holds that unless 
the corroborative evidence implicates the accused in 
the offense charged and is inconsistent with his inno-
cence that it is the duty of the trial court to direct a 
verdict for the defendant. Se'e also State vs. Cox, Utah 
277 P. 972. 
State vs. Butterfield, Utah, 261 P. 804 holds that 
the corroborative evidence is insufficient if it merely 
casts a grave suspicion on the accused. Se'e also State 
L:s. Simpson, Utah, 236 P2 1077. 
Obviously, the fact that defendant Stockton was 
found in the company with Carter and Goddard could 
do no rnore than cast a grave suspicion upon Stockton 
and the testimony of Goddard implicating Stockton has 
not been corroborated and the evidence against the de-
fendant is insufficient to sustain the conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the defendant Stockton should 
be reversed for the reason that the evidence is insuf-
ficient to sustain the conviction; that the Court erred 
in admitting into evidence hearsay evidence in the form 
of a conversation between Deputy A. R. Covieo and one 
of the co-defendants, which conversation was had out 
of the presence of the defendant and which related to 
the commission of the crime charged, and that the failure 
of the Court to give to the jury defendant's requested 
instructions numbered one to six, withheld from the 
jury the correct law to be applied to the facts in evidence. 
Respectfully submitted 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for defendant 
and appellant 
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